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Article 14

RECENT CASE NOTES
of shipment the buyer becomes liable for the price and the seller is not
limited to an action for damages for breach of contract, for the beneficial
interest, subject only to security title, has passed to the buyer.15 These are
the principal reasons why the place where beneficial interest passes should
be controlling. Moreover, there are other factors which tend to show that,
though legal title is in the seller, all of the incidents of ownership have passed
to the buyer. It has been held that if the buyer makes and keeps good a
tender of the price, he is entitled to the goods as against the seller, and, if,
without default on the part of the buyer, the seller should sell or otherwise
16
dispose of the goods, the buyer could hold the seller liable for conversion.
In addition, many courts speak of a divided property interest in the goods,
or that title passes to the buyer and the seller retains only a right of possession,
a jus disponendi.17 While the problem was not presented in the present case,
the trend of the decisions would tend to support the conclusion that for the
purpose of taxation, the sale takes place where the beneficial interest passes
R. E. M.
to the buyer.
GUARANTY-SCOPE OF THE OaLIGATION.-Appellant brought an action for a
declaratory judgment to determine her liability, if any, upon a purported
guaranty of preferred stock certificates. Pursuant to a reorganization agreement, the name of a certain corporation was changed to the J. B. Hamilton
Furniture Co., and $170,000 of preferred stock was issued by it and assigned
to certain of the appellees. These certificates of preferred stock provided
for an absolute payment of the par value thereof with cumulative dividends
and possible penalties in ten years from the date of issuance. Pursuant to
the original contract, the appellant and one J. B. Hamilton executed the
following writing upon the back of each of the certificates of preferred stock:
"We, the undersigned, guarantee the payment of this certificate of stock
according to its terms." The corporation became insolvent and a receiver
was appointed. Held, that even though the certificates of preferred stock
created no enforceable primary obligation against the corporation, nevertheless the guarantor is liable for the failure to pay the amount thereof.,2
This case raises a fundamental question in the law of Guaranty, to wit:
Is the scope of the guarantor's liability limited to situations where there is
involved the debt, default, miscarriage, or other obligation of a principal?

518; Standard Casing Co. v. California Casing Co. (1922), 233 N. Y. 413,
135 N. E. 834, Smith v. Marano (1920), 267 Pa. 107, 110 A. 94.
I Maffei v. Ginocchio (1921), 299 Ill. 254, 132 N. E. 518; Rosenberg v.
Buffum (1922), 234 N. Y. 338, 137 N. E. 609; Smith v. Marano (1920), 267
Pa. 107, 110 A. 94.
16Rudin v. King Richardson Co. (1924), 311 IBI. 513, 143 N. E. 119; Ogg
v. Shuter (1875), L. R. 10 C. P 159.
17 Standard Casing Co. v. California Casing Co. (1922), 233 N. Y. 413,
135 N. E. 834; Rosenberg v. Buffum (1922), 234- N. Y. 338, 137 N. E. 609;
Rutonjee v. Frame (1923), 205 App. Div. 354, 199 N. Y. S. 523, Robinson v.
Houston Ry. Co. (1912), 105 Texas 185, 146 S. W 537.
1 Hamilton v. Meiks (Ind. 1936), 4 N. E. (2d) 536.
2 For the purposes of this note any possible distinctions between Suretyship
and Guaranty will not be considered, for it is believed that the principles
discussed will apply to both concepts.
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Perhaps a proper approach to this question will not be obtained unless
one accepts a bit of cautioning, as put by the Indiana Supreme Court, thus:
"There is considerable loose writing in the text books upon the subjects of
guaranty and suretyship."3
Some definitions of a surety or guarantor's
liability as submitted by eminent judges and text-writers are as follows.
J. Cooley: "A surety is a person, who being liable to pay a debt or perform
an obligation, is entitled, if it is enforced against him, to be indemnified by
some other person, who ought himself to have made payment or performance
before the surety was compelled to do so." 4 Mr. Brandt says, "A surety or
guarantor is one who becomes responsible for the debt, default, or miscarriage
of another person."5 Mr. Williston says, "Whoever is liable to pay the debt
of another
is a surety."6
In accordance with the views of the above mentioned experts, there is
much dictum and some authority for the proposition that a guaranty, "in its
enlarged sense," is a promise to answer for the payment of some debt, or the
performance of some duty, owed by another, who in the first instance is
liable therefor. 7 Also, it is true that the great majority of guaranty cases
which arise are those in which the performance of a legal obligation is the
risk assumed by the guarantor's promise. However, it does not follow that
the existence of an enforceable primary obligation marks the limits of the
scope of the guaranty contract. This conclusion seems to be a necessary
deduction from the principal case, and in this respect it is believed to be in
accord with the weight of authority in the United States.8
A discussion of the authorities will clearly illustrate the above conclusion.
An early Indiana case held that a guaranty of a married woman's contract
was enforceable against the guarantor notwithstanding that the promise of
a feme covert was at that time void. 9 In Backus v. Feeks,lO where a statute
3 McMillan v. Bull's Head Bank (1869), 32 Ind. 11, 13, 2 Am. Rep. 323.
4 Smith v. Shelden (1876), 35 Mich. 42, 47.
5 Brandt, Suretyship and Guaranty (3d Ed.), Vol. 1, See. 1.
6 Williston, On Contracts, Vol. 2, Sec. 1211.
7 Burnham v. Gallentine (1858), 11 Ind. 295; Merchants Nat. Bank v.
Citizens State Bank (1895), 93 Ia. 650, 61 N. W 1065, Bishop Press Co. v.
Lowe (1919), 201 Mo. App. 68, 209 S. W 962; Smith v. Dickerson (1845),
6 Humph. (Tenn.) 261, 44 Am. Dec. 306, Kilbride v. Moss (1896), 113 Cal.
432, 45 P 812; First Nat. Bank v. Kinner (1873), 1 Utah 100; Hooker v.
Russell (1886), 67 Wis. 257, Reissans v. White (1907), 128 Mo. App. 135,
106 S. W 603, Webster v. Metropolitan Washing Machine Co. (1868), 29
Ind. 453.
8 Davis v. Statts (1873), 43 Ind. 103, 13 Am. Rep. 382; Backus v. Feeks
(1913), 71 Wash. 508, 129 P 86, Sedalia, W & S. R. R. Co. v. Smith (1837),
27 Mo. App. 371, Perkins-Goodwin Co. v. Hart (1912), 83 N. J. 471, 83 A.
877.
9 Davis v. Statts (1873), 43 Ind. 103, 13 Am.Rep. 382. It is worthy of
notice, too, that such a promise was void and not merely voidable, for at
least one jurisdiction has attempted to rationalize the question of the guarantor's liability vhen there is "no enforceable primary obligation upon the
difference between a "void" and a "voidable" primary obligation. See, J. Sommerville in Sharnagel v. Furst (1927), 215 Ala. 528, 128 So. 102. Also,
see 12 Ruling Case Law 1072.
10 (1913), 71 Wash. 508, 129 P 86.
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made any unacknowledged lease for more than one year a mere tenancy from
month to month, the court held a guarantor for the "payment" of rent on an
unacknowledged lease for five years, even though the lessee was not bound
to the lease and did in fact repudiate it. In Holm v. Jamieson,1l a decree
of a court of equity had declared a note of a corporation unenforceable
because it was not executed by an officer with authority to do so, but nevertheless a guaranty written upon the back of the note was enforceable, and
the guarantor was not a director nor in any way connected with the corporation. The cases seem quite uniform in holding a director or officer of a
corporation as guarantor upon an ultra vires undertaking by the corporation.12
This result is generally based upon estoppel, the courts holding that the
guarantor by his promise represents that the corporation had capacity and
that the transaction is a valid one. Where the payment of a note was
guaranteed, the guarantor was liable even though the note was a forgery,'13
a real or inherent defense in the original contract as distinguished from
those generally known as personal defenses. So further, there are numerous
cases of high authority where the issue was squarely presented, holding the
guarantor liable on his contract even though there was no enforceable primary
or principal obligation.14
Some leading encyclopedias of law, 1 5 after asserting as a well recognized
principle, that the guarantor's contract is accessorial and secondary to some
other obligation which is the principal or primary one, begin to make exceptions to the rule by saying that where the defect in the primary obligation
is "personal," the guarantor is still liable; whereas, if it is "inherent" in the
contract, the guarantor is not liable. Another theory reads to the effect that
where the principal obligation is "void," the guarantor is not liable; but
where it is "voidable" only, the guarantor will be held. Exceptions to these
exceptions then ensue. Thus they attempt to rationalize the numerous cases
where there never was a primary debt, default, miscarriage, or other legal
obligation. Professor Arnold, in a highly respected work upon this subject,
divides all contractual obligations into independent and accessorial obligations, the guarantor's contract being of the latter type. Accessorial obligations
in turn are divided into primary and secondary duties, and the latter into
absolute and conditional duties.16 He then lists the above cases as excep11 (1898), 173 II. 295, 50 N. E. 702.
12Krekel v. Thomasma (1931), 255 Mich. 283, 238 N. W 255, Holm v.
Jamieson (1898), 173 Ill. 295, 50 N. E. 702; Gist and Scott, Adm'rs v. Drakely
(1844), 2 Gill (Mo.) 330, 41 Am. Dec. 426; Bell v. Kirkland (1907), 102
Minn. 213, 113 N. W. 271; Remsen v. Graves (1869), 41 N. Y. 471, Bowman
Cycle Co. v. Dyer (1900), 31 Misc. 496, 64 N. Y. S. 551; Perry v.
Brown (1899), 21 Ky. L. 344, 51 S.W 457, Weare v. Sawyer (1862), 44
N. H. 198.
13 First Nat. Bank v. Bair (1934), 315 Pa. 463, 173 A. 329; Veazie v.
Willis (1856), 6 Gray (Mass.) 90.
14Stearns v. Marks (1862), 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 565; Krekel v. Thomasma
(1931), 255 Mich. 283, 238 N. W 255, Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Cohen
(Ill. App. 1936), 1 N. E. (2d) 717; McLaughlin v. McGovern (1861), 34Barb. (N. Y.) 208.
15 28 C. J.909; 12 R. C. L. 1072.
'16Earl C. Arnold, "Primary and Secondary Obligations" (1926), 74 U. Pa.
L. R. 36.
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tions to the rules, which would play havoc with the concise diagrams drawn
by him to illustrate his theory. It is believed that such nomenclature as
"personal," "inherent," "secondary," "primary," "void," "voidable," "accessorial," "absolute," "conditional" are of no aid to the practising lawyer, who
looks for a working rule of law to serve him as a basis for prediction or
draftsmanship. Thus, in the case of an infant one can understand that the
defect in the principal undertaking is a personal defect which may be waived
by the infant. Also, one might go so far as to concede that a contract of a
married woman, void at common law, was still a type of personal defect,
i. e., a defect in the person rather than the nature of the contract. However,
if a corporation has capacity to execute an instrument or to enter into a
certain contract, but the contract nevertheless is void because executed by an
officer without authority, is this a "personal" or an "inherent" defect in the
contract of the corporation? Also, if a note is forged, is there any defect in
17
Yet the courts continually hold a guarantor
any contract more inherent?
liable in these cases where to do so is consistent with the terms of the
guarantor's contract. Thus it can be seen that a defect is only "personal"
because a court said it was; or that a certain promise of a guarantor is
"absolute" and not "conditional" only after the court so adjudicates. These
words and others of like import are results, not rules of law forming a basis
for reasoning upon the facts of a new case.
Perhaps it is possible to point out the reason why the aforementioned textwriters, encyclopedias, and a very few cases assert with such apparent confidence that "a guaranty being collateral to another obligation, there can be
8
In the opinion of the
no guaranty if there is no principal obligation."'1
writer, the Statute of Frauds is mainly responsible for the use of such dictum.
To it may be added the old, rapidly weakening rule of strictisszm Juris, by
which the device of suretyship was almost entirely obliterated in a commercially minded civilization. It will be noticed that under the Statute of Frauds
only such undertakings as promise to answer for the "debt, default, or miscarriages" of another must be in writing. Does it follow that all guaranty
contracts must be in writing? Hundreds of cases may be found in the
digests where oral guaranty contracts are enforced. Thus, no one will question the rule that an undertaking to answer for the debt, default, or mis19
Nevertheless,
carriage of an infant is enforceable as a guaranty contract.
such undertaking need not be in writing, but is enforceable though made
orally;20 The same is true of the contracts of married women, or of the
2
ultra vires undertakings of corporations. 1 Thus, it will be seen that in any
case involving the Statute of Frauds only that type of guaranty contract
17 Sec. 23, Negotiable Instrument Law, Burns' 1933, Sec. 19-123.
18 Merchants Nat. Bank v. Citizens State Bank (1895), 93 Ia. 650, 61 N. W.
1065; State Bank v. Knotts (1856), 10 Rich L. (S. C.) 543, 70 Am. Dec. 234,
Smith v. Dickerson (1845), 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 261, 44 Am. Dec. 306; 12 R. C.
L. 1072.
19 McKee v. Hardwood Automotive Co. (Ind. App. 1928), 162 N. E. 62.
2
o King v. Summitt (1881), 73 Ind. 312, 38 Am. Rep. 145.
21Kilbride v. Moss (1896), 113 Cal. 4-32, 45 P 812; First National Bank
v. Kinner (1873), 1 Utah 100; Hooker v. Russell (1886), 67 Wis. 257,
Buchanan v. Moran (1892), 62 Conn. 83.
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which necessarily involves the requirement of an enforceable primary obligation is before the court, for the rule as to the Statute of Frauds is that where
there is an enforceable primary obligation against the principal, the guarantor's promise must be in writing; whereas, if there is no enforceable obligation against the principal, the guarantor's promise may be enforced though
made orally. 22 However, many courts, including an Indiana decision, seeking
to enforce an oral promise, have gone far to disprove a guaranty contract
entirely, when the only issue involved was such a guaranty as is governed
by the Statute of Frauds. 2 3
How, then, may one determine the limits of the guarantor's contract in any
given case? The decision in the principal case answers this question in a
concise manner. The court construed the appellant's contract objectively and
held that it was the "payment" of the stock which was guaranteed, and not
an "obligation" to pay which was guaranteed, for there was no enforceable
obligation against the J. B. Hamilton Furniture Co. Thus, it was the "act"
of payment and not the "duty" of payment which was guaranteed. In this
respect it is consistent with the weight of authority to the effect that in every
case we must look to the terms of the guaranty and the circumstances under
which it was made to ascertain the character and extent of the undertaking.2 4
So if by the terms of the contract an "obligation" is guaranteed, then there
must be a valid principal obligation in order to hold the guarantor; whereas,
if by the terms of the guaranty contract, the performance of an act by a
third person is guaranteed, then the guarantor will be liable upon the failure
thereof, regardless of whether or not there was a legal obligation to perform
the act.
It is believed that the holding in the principal case is based upon a sound,
workable rule of law. A different result would tend to "unsettle business
transactions to the great detriment of public interests." 2 5 The decision is
refreshing in that it refrains from entering upon the dilemma of "accessorial,"
"primary," "secondary," "absolute," or "conditional" obligations of the guarantor. Furthermore, it assures the use of the guaranty contract as a risk
shifting device to gain security in personam.
H. L. T.
22 Browne, Statute of Frauds (1895, 5th ed.), Sec. 156.
23 Anderson v. Spence (1880), 72 Ind. 315, 37 Am. Rep. 162; Kilbride v.
Moss
(1896), 113 Cal. 432, 45 P 812.
2
4Welsh v. Ebersole (1881), 75 Va. 651; Backus v. Feeks (1913), 71
Wash. 508, 129 P. 86; Sedalia, W. & S. R. R. Co. v. Smith (1837), 27 Mo.
App. 371; Perkins-Goodwin Co. v. Hart (1912), 83 N. J. L. 471, 83 A. 877,
McCallister v. Nat. Bank of New Mexico (N. M. 1936), 56 P (2d) 485;
Holm v. Jamieson (1898), 173 Ill.
295, 50 N. E. 702.
25 Holm v. Jamieson (1898), 173 Ill.
295, 50 N. E. 702.

